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[2606.03051] On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions
Abstract page for arXiv paper 2606.03051: On the sufficiency of unidirectional incentive compatibility in auctions
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![[2307.11967] Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals](/static/img/curated/desks/afbytes-tech.png)
[2307.11967] Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
Abstract page for arXiv paper 2307.11967: Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
[2605.30515] Obviously Strategy-proof Choice of Social Acts
Abstract page for arXiv paper 2605.30515: Obviously Strategy-proof Choice of Social Acts
[2605.28133] Learning to Bid in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Dynamic Values and Aggregated Feedback
Abstract page for arXiv paper 2605.28133: Learning to Bid in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Dynamic Values and Aggregated Feedback
[2605.28263] Existence and Optimality of Envy-Free random allocations
Abstract page for arXiv paper 2605.28263: Existence and Optimality of Envy-Free random allocations